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Abstract
This paper examines the roles of identity-based conflict and secessionist sentiment in motivating
and affecting political decentralization in middle-income democracies. The literature on
decentralization largely assumes a link between the process and increased political accountability
and service delivery effectiveness; however, these theories do not take into account cases in which
national crisis and regional instability are the primary motives to decentralize. This paper
hypothesizes that when decentralization occurs in direct response to threats of secession, the quality
of its political accountability and service delivery mechanisms will be lower than would otherwise
be predicted. Two cases are considered: the Philippines, whose decentralization occurred under a
stable and well-institutionalized democratic regime, and Indonesia, which radically and rapidly
decentralized in the face of high-intensity conflicts in Aceh, Maluku, and Papua. Ultimately, the
careful construction and implementation of a moderate devolution program in the Philippines led to
success in the areas of political accountability and service delivery, while the more extreme
Indonesian program faced long-term challenges and shortcomings in those same areas. Neither
country, however, can be said to have successfully eliminated regional separatism or otherwise
incorporated discontented groups into their devolved systems, suggesting that this process
represents a particular challenge to newly decentralized regimes.

Introduction
In 1998, following the rapid collapse of a decades-old autocratic regime, the state of
Indonesia abruptly aborted a sixty-year experiment with centralized administrative rule. The new
leadership instead embarked on a hastily implemented program of administrative decentralization,
labeled by observers as “the most daring decentralization policy in developing countries.” Seven
years earlier, Indonesia’s neighbor to the northeast, the Philippines, engaged in a similar process of
decentralization, devolving power from the center in Manila to regional units across the
archipelago. While both these processes were well received domestically and internationally for
their democratic natures and economically liberal reforms, Philippine decentralization has achieved
a measure of success that Indonesia has largely failed to match. This discrepancy has been
quantified by findings of the Legatum Institute’s Prosperity Index, which found the Philippines
scoring significantly higher than Indonesia in areas of government effectiveness, government
stability, rule of law, judicial confidence, and institutional corruption in the years 2010-2015.1
Why has political decentralization led to increased political accountability and service
delivery in the Philippines to a greater degree than in Indonesia? More broadly, how do different
strategies of decentralization affect a state’s long-term political stability and economic success?
Policies of political decentralization have seen wide-scale adaptation throughout the developing
world in the past twenty years, in part due to the encouragement of traditional neoliberal policies by
powerful institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, as well as major political powers such as
the United States. Devolutionary policies have been implemented at an exceptionally high rate in
Southeast Asia, a rapidly growing and developing region of the world that has become increasingly
critical to the global economic community. An understanding of the nuances and potential

1

Legatum Institute (2015)

1

complications of political decentralization is therefore essential to evaluating the quality and
stability of governmental institutions in this historically understudied region.
Proponents of political decentralization emphasize its role in fostering local political
accountability, innovative service delivery, and increased community engagement. However, these
theories have largely been developed in the context of high-income states such as the United
Kingdom and the United States, and have comparatively little practical application to the newly
established democracies of Southeast Asia. In particular, these theories assume that political
decentralization will take place methodologically and moderately under a highly stable regime, as in
the case of most high-income states. They do not take into account the crucial factors of political
stability and ethnic and religious identity, areas of great importance to these highly diverse and
relatively weakly institutionalized archipelagic regimes.
This paper will test the argument that the degree of success of political decentralization is
dependent on the degree of political and social stability that the state has achieved prior to initiating
the process of devolution. The Philippines decentralized under a secure and well-institutionalized
regime, during the rule of popular progressive leader Corazon Aquino, and was therefore able to
disregard concerns over ethnic stability or secessionist movements in favor of a more moderate and
judiciously implemented program of decentralization. Indonesia, by contrast, decentralized in what
was labeled an atmosphere of “national crisis,” in which ethnic tensions were flaring and regional
secession appeared imminent. The government was forced to hastily implement a program of
radical decentralization for the primary and immediate purpose of staving off the collapse of
Indonesian sovereignty in these areas, which ultimately carried problematic implications for the
state’s political accountability and service delivery effectiveness in both the near and far future.

2

Literature Review
The term “political decentralization” refers to a process of devolution of political power, in
which some degree of political authority is transferred to sub-national actors, such as states, regions,
or districts. Decentralization is distinct from other processes of devolution, such as deconcentration,
in that power is not transferred to sub-national branches of the central government, but rather,
independent units that have near-complete control over revenues and expenditures alike.2 Because
of this high degree of autonomy, decentralization policies must include the implementation of
democratic mechanisms of political accountability, so as to ensure that the local population can hold
these units accountable to their needs and desires. If executed properly, many advocates argue,
political decentralization will yield increased political accountability and more effective service
delivery. However, these claims have been challenged by a number of scholars, who argue that
decentralization must be understood as a highly complex process that will not be fully applicable to
a wide variety of contexts and settings.
The popular academic literature on political decentralization was established by Charles
Tiebout in his 1956 article “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” His theory of decentralization is
simple and straightforward: as political decentralization occurs, a greater diversity of communities,
each promoting a unique structure of taxes and public goods, will emerge. Citizens, assumed to be
fully mobile and equally informed, may then “shop” for the community that best approximates their
tax and public good preferences. In the case of the vast majority of public services, including
policing, fire protection, education, healthcare, and others, decentralization can therefore only
produce a more vibrant, competitive, and accountable market for public goods.3
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Tiebout’s model of decentralization is best applied to a high-income urban environment, in
which the presence of a large central municipality and many surrounding suburbs offer a variety of
public benefits and tax expenditures to choose from. When applied to large-scale decentralization
programs, as have occurred in Indonesia and the Philippines, this model’s assumptions all but fall
apart. In particular, Tiebout’s assumption of full mobility among citizens is highly misguided; in the
tribally organized Maluku islands in Indonesia, for example, no citizen is at all likely to abandon
their ancestral homelands and extended family, regardless of whatever tax benefits or increased
public services they may accrue in a neighboring district.
We cannot fault Tiebout for these misassumptions, as he likely never intended his model to
extend beyond the realm of Western urban politics in the first place. Nonetheless, his theory has
been expanded upon by subsequent generations of neoliberal theorists to create support for
decentralization as a fundamental political norm, applicable to any scenario. This normative theory
of decentralization, as articulated by Ken Kollman, is that a decentralized government will naturally
spur greater citizen involvement and bring local governments closer to their constituents, leading to
increased political accountability and greater fiscal responsibility.4 This argument was further
refined in Wallace Oates’ Fiscal Federalism, in which he argued that in addition to fostering
accountability, political decentralization can increase the efficiency of local government service
delivery by encouraging greater awareness of community preferences.5
Throughout the late 20th century, scholars found evidence in support of these theories of
decentralization in a wide variety of contexts. In a study of neighborhood governance in New York
state, Douglas Yates found that decentralization “unquestionably” created more direct democracy, a
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finding that he argued benefited historically underrepresented minorities and other constituencies.6
Bowles et al. suggest that these trends of decentralization in America ought to be replicated in the
United Kingdom, arguing that the norm of executive strength in the latter case is in desperate need
of reexamination.7 Approaching the subject from the opposite end, Ken Kollman, in Perils of
Centralization, links the increasing political entrenchment and immobility of institutions such as the
Catholic Church and the European Union to their mutual trends of administrative centralization.8
These investigations have served to further reinforce the notion that political decentralization is a
practical solution to a wide assortment of issues in governance.
In addition to these benefits in political accountability and service delivery, scholars have
long pointed to decentralization as a method of fostering productive experimentation and innovation
within a political system. In essence, each individual subunit is free to experiment in novel methods
of service delivery without posing a risk to the state itself; those that are successful can then be
easily identified and applied system-wide. This theory was treated as fact by Justice Louis Brandeis
in 1932, when he argued, “A single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”9
Later scholars have identified these experiments as key methods of increasing system efficiency in
many areas. In his manuscript “On States as Policy Laboratories,” Craig Volden provides evidence
that decentralization can increase opportunities for innovation in public policy.10 Outside of the
political sphere, Chang and Harrington apply this theory to large retail chains, arguing that a
decentralized organization gives freedom to store managers to adopt their own ideas and
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disseminate innovations.11 This conclusion is supported by Darr et al., who collected data from 36
Pennsylvanian pizza stores and found that knowledge transfers significantly farther across stores
owned by the same franchisee.12
As these many benefits of decentralization were so energetically proclaimed throughout the
20th century, it is no surprise that subsequent counter-research has occurred among a diverse array
of scholars. In the areas of political accountability and economic growth, González et al. find that
the role of political decentralization in fostering accountability is undocumented in their model of
political budget cycles,13 while Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose have demonstrated no statistical
relationship between political decentralization and economic growth.14 Decentralization may in fact
hinder governmental efficacy, as evidenced in a case study of New York City Public Schools, which
found that decentralization led to systemic corruption, without any of the supposed benefits.15
Counter to Justice Brandeis’s link between decentralization and local innovation, Kollman, a
decentralization advocate, nonetheless argues that subunits are not necessarily better at innovating
than the center. Rather, decentralized units are best able to address moderately difficult problems,
while for simple and difficult problems, centralization may be the better search method.16
Ultimately, these studies indicate that the link between decentralization and political and economic
accountability is selectively demonstrable at best, and may not be established even in the contexts
that decentralization scholars have long used to construct their theories.
In short, the literature on political decentralization and its effects is frustratingly polarized
and inconclusive. In The Architecture of Government, Daniel Treisman ultimately concludes, “The
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simple conclusion about administrative decentralization is that there is no simple conclusion.”17 It is
clear, however, that few of the major trends in decentralization theory, focused as they are on
politically stable and high-income cases such as the United States and the United Kingdom, have
very much practical application in lower-income and more democratically fragile cases such as
Indonesia and the Philippines. The case of Indonesia is a particular puzzle: the state chose to
decentralize under a fragile administration, immediately following a revolution that ousted a thirtyyear-old regime. This was a daring and unorthodox strategy of decentralization that the literature
would likely not predict or recommend.
An explanation for the curious timing of Indonesia’s decentralization program lies in the
relatively unconsidered link between political decentralization and the maintenance or restoration of
political and economic sovereignty. Martha McCollough proposes this link in her study of the
Hasinais, one of the principal Native American chiefdoms in eastern Texas during the 1700s, and
their experience following the establishment of Spanish power in the region. As the Hasinais faced
increasing economic and political challenges due to the introduction of diseases, the rise of
mercantilism, and substantial shifts in trade routes, McCollough posits that it became advantageous
to decentralize the political organization of the chiefdom. This is because no actor, internal or
external, would then be able to threaten the entire community by threatening its center; instead, each
newly established subcommunity was able to negotiate the complex and challenging networks of
trade and diplomacy that applied to them specifically.18
Literature on this link between decentralization and sovereignty is frustratingly absent, apart
from McCollough’s anthropological contributions. Nonetheless, the experience of Indonesia in the
late 1990s mirrors that of the Hasinai chiefdom far more closely than it does those of the United
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States, the United Kingdom, or even the Philippines. World Bank economist Anwar Shah labels this
sovereignty-related strategy of decentralization as the “Big Bang” approach, given its necessarily
comprehensive nature and extraordinarily rapid implementation.19 In the Indonesian case, the threat
to state sovereignty was not external, but rather, internal, as the state struggled to calm ethnic
conflict in Maluku, battled secessionist guerrillas in the long-suppressed regions of Aceh and Papua,
and failed to retain East Timor in a contentious and highly traumatic referendum.
This paper argues that Indonesia’s decentralization program, occurring as it did in an
environment of territorial crisis, was conceived not as a conventionally moderate program of
increased political efficacy, but rather, as a strategy to immediately mitigate secessionist ambitions
across the state. Because of the unconventional priorities of Indonesia’s “big bang” decentralization
and the haste of its implementation, the program’s achievement of the benefits of decentralization in
political accountability and service delivery was limited. The Philippines, which decentralized in a
much more stable environment of national sovereignty, constructed and implemented its program in
a manner more consistent with standard models of decentralization; because of this, the country
achieved greater success in the same areas of accountability and service delivery.
This paper organized in the following manner. First, it examines the historical and political
context of centralized rule in the cases of Indonesia and the Philippines, and how each case chose its
path of devolution. The two are then compared in their achievements of political accountability and
service delivery efficacy, both of which are predicted by the literature to increase as a result of
decentralization. Ultimately, this investigation intends to clarify the likely effects of decentralization
for the purpose of territorial integrity, and contribute to the literature exploring alterative methods
and outcomes of this complex and frequently oversimplified political process.
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Political Order in Indonesia
Indonesia’s first political units, most notably the Srivijaya Empire of Sumatra and the
Majapahit kingdom of Java, were characterized by weakly institutionalized and fragmented political
structures. These empires have been retroactively characterized as “thalassocracies,” referring to a
model of government in which sea trade networks are maintained by the regime, while interior
realms and areas outside of the trade network remain largely ungoverned.20 This mode of
Indonesian governance continued during the arrival of Islam from Arabia and India in the 13th-15th
centuries, as large sultanates, such as Mataram in central Java and Banten in the Sunda Strait,
maintained wealthy trade empires and fended off colonial encroachment for close to two hundred
years. Like their predecessors, these empires failed to penetrate the remote interiors of Indonesia’s
largest islands.21 The islands of what is now eastern Indonesia, including the Maluku archipelago
and West Papua, were never integrated into the Muslim world in the first place, and remained
highly isolated regions until the concentration of Dutch power in the archipelago in the 1800s.
Following Vasco da Gama’s discovery of the naval route to India in 1497, the Indonesian
archipelago was penetrated by successive waves of European powers, all seeking to establish trade
routes to the coveted spices of the Maluku islands. European colonial powers maintained a
superficial presence in Indonesia for several centuries, preferring to rule through puppet states and
facilitate trade without investing in administrative infrastructure.22 The regime established by the
Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, or VOC), which consolidated
control over the entire archipelago in the late 1600s, maintained this strategy of indirect rule for the
explicit purpose of resource acquisition. The nature of power in Indonesia was decisively
transformed only in 1816, when the VOC was dismantled following the Napoleonic Wars, and the
20
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Dutch state took control of the territory.23 Unlike the VOC, the Dutch regime was not satisfied with
indirect rule, and took on the mammoth challenge of establishing a centralized state across what
was an immensely remote and diverse region.
The consolidation of Dutch power in Indonesia, which took close to a hundred years to
achieve, was met with fierce resistance in many regions, including a Javanese uprising in 1825, a
sustained Acehnese insurgency throughout the late 19th century, and the horrific puputan mass
suicide of Balinese royalty following the conquest of that island in 1906.24 The rule of the Dutch in
Indonesia was notoriously brutal, even for a colonial regime. Unlike the British in India, who saw
their role there as civilizers as well as rulers, Dutch motives in Indonesia were strictly economical,
with the result that Indonesians were never afforded opportunities to climb the administrative and
educational hierarchies of Dutch rule until just two decades prior their departure.25 The Dutch
colonial legacy therefore consisted primarily of infrastructural investments (having finally
penetrated the isolated interiors of Sumatra and Borneo), as well a centralized and hierarchical
administration, based in Jakarta, which reached across the entire archipelago.
This legacy of centralization was maintained following the success of the Indonesian
independence movement, which endured insurgencies against the Dutch, the Japanese in World
War II, and the Dutch once more at the war’s end. Sukarno, leader of the Indonesian Revolution and
the first president of the Republic of Indonesia, viewed administrative centralization as the only
means by which to maintain unity in what was still a highly fragmented collection of islands.26
After Sukarno was ousted in a military takeover in 1968, the newly established leader Suharto
proclaimed what became known as the “New Order,” a regime took this tendency of centralization

23

Ibid., 24
Vickers (2005), 9
25
Ibid., 40
26
Turner (2006), 258
24

10

to new extremes. Suharto’s Indonesia was characterized by the enhanced presence of the military in
nearly every sector, the creation of an intricate network of patronage and officially sanctioned
corruption, and the suppression of religious and ethnic identities outside of moderate Islam.27
Javanese ethnic power was further consolidated during this period, as Suharto encouraged vast
migration projects to resettle Javanese migrants in remote regions, leading to conflict between the
colonizers and indigenous peoples in Papua, Kalimantan, Sumatra, and elsewhere.28 Political power
under Suharto was codified in the Regional Government Law of 1974, which established a
centralized hierarchical structure in which the central government in Jakarta managed its 27
regional units largely as extensions of itself.29
In short, political power in Indonesia has historically taken two forms. Prior to the
introduction of European imperialism, Indonesian empires were typically expansive but fractured,
weakly institutionalized, and indirectly ruled from a small but secure base. After the assumption of
Dutch direct rule over the archipelago, Indonesian political power became highly authoritarian and
hierarchical, originating from the center of power in Java, so as to unite by force this diverse and
fragmented region. Centralization in Indonesia reached its peak in the New Order era of
authoritarian military rule, in which all political power flowed up to Jakarta and into the hands of
Suharto and his network of cronies; however, this mode of governance was not a perversion of the
recent Indonesian political order, so much as an extreme take on what had been business as usual.

Political Order in the Philippines
The earliest known Philippine political units largely resemble those first governing
Indonesia in their fragmentation and degree of decentralization. Like Indonesia, the Philippine
27
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islands were ruled by a multifarious set of thalassocracies, such as the Kingdom of Tondo on the
island of Luzon, and the Huangdom of Ma-i in the center of the archipelago.30 The Philippine
kingdoms enjoyed a diverse network of trade contacts, establishing relations at various points in
history with Chinese dynasties, Indian Rajahnates, and Bruneian sultanates alike. The latter
eventually conquered the Kingdom of Tondo outright and established a series of satellite sultanates
in Sulu and Mindanao, the latter of which has retained a distinct Islamic identity ever since.31
The European presence in the Philippines began with the 1521 expedition of Spanish
navigator Ferdinand Magellan, who claimed the entirety of the archipelago for Spain.32 Unlike
many European claims in the early age of imperialism, this one was followed up by a sustained
Spanish presence in the Philippines for the next four hundred years. Spanish rule in the region was
centered in the north island of Luzon, where the present-day capital, Manila, was established; the
empire’s influence steadily spread south until the eventual conquest of the southernmost major
island, Mindanao, in the late 19th century.33 Like the Dutch in Indonesia, the Spanish faced the
difficult challenge of ruling a historically diverse and fragmented collection of islands, each
maintaining its own distinct cultural and political identity.
Like the VOC, the Spanish practiced indirect rule in the Philippines until the late 19th
century, at which point the imperial rulers likewise centralized and standardized their political
administration.34 When the United States took over the archipelago following the 1898 SpanishAmerican War, this trend of centralization and state building was maintained, as the new colonizers
prioritized increasing state capacity, building transportation and communication infrastructure, and
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consolidating their sovereignty throughout the territory.35 The United States was the first power in
the Philippines to effectively unite the entirety of the archipelago under a single regime, although
only after an immensely devastating war that cost between 150,000 and 200,000 lives.36 Even then,
the occupiers faced occasional armed resistance in rural areas, and were unable to terminate military
control by force of the Moro province.37 Following World War II and a period of Japanese
occupation, the Philippines were granted outright independence in 1946 as the Philippine Republic.
As in the case of Indonesia, the post-independence Philippines were characterized by a high
degree of centralized rule, due to the historical political division of the country, the legacy of
centralized rule from the Spanish and Americans, and the weak cultural ties across the archipelago.
Politicians under the Republic’s first presidents considered several proposals to devolve authority to
local governments for more efficient rule, but preferred instead to initiate processes of
deconcentration, in which political power was simply devolved within central government
bureaucracies over which Philippine legislators and presidents exerted a high degree of influence.
As one politician explained it, the Philippines “remained a country where local governments had to
appeal to national politicians to get windows fixed in City Hall.”38 This tendency of centralization
was only exacerbated under the highly corrupt rule of Ferdinand Marcos, who ruled the country
under varying degrees of martial law from 1965 to 1986.
In short, the patterns of political order in Indonesia and the Philippines are remarkably
similar. Both states are inventions of the European imperial system, as the empires that inhabited
them beforehand were largely thassalocratic and weakly institutionalized. European powers created
highly centralized administrative bureaucracies to unite these fragmented and divided
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archipelagoes, which were then retained by post-independence regimes in both states. As we will
see, following the collapse of long-stagnant authoritarian regimes, both Indonesia and the
Philippines turned to decentralization as a method to reverse this long-lasting colonial legacy.

Implementing Decentralization in Indonesia
In 1998, the collapse of the Thai Baht initiated the East Asian Financial Crisis, a global
economic recession that devastated the Indonesian economy more than any other.39 As a result, the
Suharto regime, long considered by observers to be firmly entrenched in power, suffered a chaotic
collapse within just one year. The New Order regime was brought down by widespread protests and
riots across the country, which, in the eastern region of Maluku, manifested as ethnic and religious
conflicts that killed close to 4,000 people and displaced 700,000 more.40 In addition, secessionist
leaders in traditionally separatist regions such as Aceh, West Papua, and East Timor seized the
opportunities lent by political instability to reinitiate long-suppressed violent campaigns for
independence. The latter campaign succeeded in gaining recognition from the United Nations, and
East Timor became fully independent in 2002.
The new Indonesian regime, led by Suharto’s former deputy Jusuf Habibie, consequently
found itself governing a severely weakened state beset by mass protests, ethnic violence, and
separatist agitation. To respond to these challenges, the Indonesian legislature drafted the 1999 Law
on Regional Government, which was enacted to satisfy opponents and silence secessionists by
delivering a massive devolution of political authority.41 Law No. 22/1999 ceded authority from the
central government to local governments in education, health, environment, labor, public works,
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and natural resource policy.42 Critically, the legislation did not devolve these responsibilities to the
country’s 27 sub-federal regions, but rather, to the more than 360 sub-regional districts and
municipalities (kabupaten and kota respectively). This highly unorthodox move occurred because
legislators were still in shock from the successful secession of East Timor, a former region, and
hoped to immediately prevent secession elsewhere by eliminating regional power across the
board.43 As such, district governments, which had been largely powerless for decades, found
themselves responsible for the lion’s share of government services almost overnight.44
The drafters of the 1999 Law on Regional Government were on an urgent mission to
respond to the aforementioned challenges facing Indonesian state sovereignty, including religious
violence in Maluku and separatist movements in Aceh and West Papua.45 To prevent impending
secession and quickly mitigate civil conflict, the law was rapidly pushed through the Indonesian
parliament, and received very little public attention.46 Legislators therefore created a comprehensive
system of district-level decentralization without facing any resistance or comment from either the
Suharto-era bureaucrats or the Indonesian public.47 International observers characterized the
resultant decentralization program as “the most daring decentralization policy in developing
countries,” based on “the most radical decentralization laws in Asia and the Pacific.”48
For such a comprehensive policy, the 1999 law itself was remarkably short, at just 36 pages
long.49 This brevity reflected the legislation’s broad nature and rapid formation, and prevented
bureaucrats from interpreting and implementing it in a universally consistent manner. As such, by
the time that the one-year deadline for the completion of the new regulations and standardizations
42
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for district governance was reached, only a third of those necessary regulations had been issued.50
Central and district officials struggled over policy coordination with existing laws, accountability
mechanisms for the heads of districts, and powers that seemed to significantly overlap. Ultimately,
while rapid decentralization to hundreds of districts may have prevented regional secession in
Indonesia as intended, the breadth and depth of the legislation, as well as the haste of its
implementation, had detrimental effects on the quality of local government function, particularly in
comparison to the Philippines’ initiation of the same process a decade earlier.

Implementing Decentralization in the Philippines
The corrupt and widely unpopular regime of Ferdinand Marcos was finally brought to an
end in 1986, when the assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino on the tarmac of Manila
International Airport led to widespread outrage and protests across the country. What began as a
popular protest movement escalated into the Philippine Revolution of 1986, whose leader, Aquino’s
widow Corazon Aquino, demanded snap presidential elections. The participation of over two
million active protestors was enough to encourage widespread defections within the Marcos regime,
preventing him from rigging the election as was his custom, and ensuring Aquino’s victory. Unlike
Indonesia’s violent and tumultuous transfer of power, the 1986 revolution, known as the People’s
Power Revolution and dubbed “the revolution that surprised the world,”51 was notable for both its
speed and its lack of a single causality.
Unlike Jusuf Habibe in Indonesia, Corazon Aquino did not inherit a nation threatened by
imminent regional secession. Rather, her new administration was focused on longer-term priorities,
such as the meritocratic reform of the military and the resolution of the Philippines’ $72.2 billion
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dollars of international debt.52 The Aquino administration therefore focused its energies on
strengthening her public support and delegitimizing military discontent, which it accomplished by
implementing a new democratic constitution in its first year.53 Devolution of power was not on
Aquino’s agenda until late 1987, almost two years into her presidency, at which point she
announced support for a proposed piece of legislation enacting decentralization. This act, the Local
Government Code, was distinct from its radical Indonesian successor in that it was conceived and
refined in a stable political environment as a program of moderate reform, without having to
respond to any threats to the regime’s sovereignty itself.
In contrast to Indonesia’s decentralization of political power to the sub-regional district
level, the Local Government Code maintained the Philippines’ long-standing hierarchy of
administrative divisions. Power was consequently decentralized to the provincial level, a move that
Indonesian legislators had sought to avoid for its secessionist potential. The same service delivery
responsibilities that Indonesia delivered to its districts, including health, agriculture, public works,
social welfare, the environment, and natural resources policy, were devolved to these 73 provinces,
referred to in the legislation as Local Government Units, or LGUs.54
While the Indonesian decentralization program received no public attention and little
legislative comment prior to its rapid implementation, the Philippine program was preceded by a
lengthy process of deliberation and debate that led to many of its provisions being partially delayed
or otherwise rolled back. Members of the House of Representatives were concerned that newly
empowered local executives could build support networks that would challenge the legislature’s
interests. As such, the House strengthened political accountability mechanisms by making it easier
for local officials to be audited and recalled, and ensured careful and systematic implementation of
52
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the law by pushing the rollout date to January 1992, which also denied local officials the
opportunity to use revenue transfers against legislators in that year’s elections.55
Ultimately, it was these characteristics of the Philippine decentralization project that led to
the program’s long-term successes over its Indonesian counterpart. Because the 1991 Local
Government Code was developed in a stable and temperate political environment, rather than one of
immediate national crisis, it experienced lengthy debate, public scrutiny, and revision, and was
implemented under a much more methodological timetable.56 The lack of any significant
secessionist threats to the Philippines allowed it to devolve to its 73 provinces (as opposed to
Indonesia’s division into 350 districts), which simplified the decentralization process immensely
and ensured that each province was large and functional enough to retain state capacity. The
following discussion will examine how these advantages of the Philippine program, coupled with
Indonesia’s shortfalls in the same areas, manifested themselves in the areas of governance that
decentralization is predicted to benefit: political accountability and service delivery.

Political Accountability in Indonesia
While post-Suharto Indonesia has remained a democracy by any measure, the quality of its
democratic institutions significantly deteriorated following the transition to decentralized
governance. The breadth and depth of Indonesia’s decentralization policy, coupled with the rapidity
of its implementation, limited the quality of political accountability mechanisms in the newly
empowered district governments. This was in part because the ambiguity of the 1999 legislation
allowed district governors (bupati) to surreptitiously claim more political power and autonomy than
they were originally intended to receive. Article 7 of the legislation, which reserved certain fields of
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policy for the central government, was interpreted by bupati as limiting the central government to
those fields alone. Article 11, which stipulated “obligatory” responsibilities for district
governments, was understood by district officials to give them exclusive authority in those areas.57
These contradictory, vague, and inconsistently applied regulations allowed bupati to strengthen
their executive power at the expense of potential central government oversight and evaluation.
Because of the vast array of executive positions available within Indonesia’s hundreds of
new districts, the same political elites who had benefited under the patronage system established by
Suharto found themselves able to effectively reinsert themselves into the new political order.
Officials who had served under the New Order regime maintained their economic and political
connections within the weakly institutionalized districts, and became what one observer referred to
as “political entrepreneurs,” offering their services to those who sought nomination by a party.58
These aspiring politicians themselves viewed the decentralization process not as an alternative to
systems of patronage, but rather, as a device to extend, renew, and incorporate these systems into
their political careers.59
As this newly empowered political elite began to dominate state politics, clientelism, vote
buying, and party patronage all became established habits within the Indonesian political order.
Afan Gaffar, a political scientist at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, estimated
that a candidate for bupati required at least 1 billion rupiah for the purchase of votes.60 When five
candidates for mayoral elections in the region of Sibolga lost their races, despite their purchases,
they publicly demanded their money back from party officials there.61 In one particularly drastic
case, a candidate for the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
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Perjuangan, or PDI-P) was able to win her local race only by quarantining all 18 members of her
party in a hotel, where they were unable to leave until they confirmed her nomination for the
position.62 In cases in which politicians who refused to toe party lines won the vote for bupati or
mayor, they often ended up losing those positions through technicalities or charges of corruption,
but in reality because members of their own party in the district legislatures (Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat Daerah, or DPRDs) betrayed them.63 The Indonesian government produces “accountability
reports” that are intended to highlight such cases of intraparty patronage and corruption, but Hamid
Awaluddin, a member of the National Election Commission, described these reports as “no more
than fields for extortion by members of legislatures.”64
The 1999 Indonesian general election demonstrated the pervasiveness of political
entrenchment and money politics within the new democracy. Candidates from Golkar, the political
party associated with Suharto and his New Order regime, were successful in almost all contests for
bupati or mayor, despite the party’s failure to dominate the general elections. This discrepancy
indicates that Golkar candidates in elections for regional positions routinely bought their support.65
The opposition PDI-P experienced similar discrepancies in vote totals in constituencies such as
Medan, where the party held 16 seats but its candidate won only 4 votes, or in Bali, where it held 17
seats but its candidate won only 11 votes.66
When indirect elections of regional heads were outright abandoned in 2004 in favor of direct
popular votes, political accountability did not necessarily increase. Instead, the political parties
merely constructed a complex system of alliances to push into power approved candidates,
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regardless of ideology or policy.67 Unlikely partnerships, such as between the secular PDI-P and the
Islamist PBB, or the Islamist PKS and the Christian PDS, demonstrated that securing victory for the
parties within the alliance was far more important than the ideology of the politician themselves.68
This was confirmed by Golkar deputy chairman, Agung Laksono, who said “There are no limits on
forming coalitions with anyone. Provided that a candidate who joins a coalition with a Golkar
candidate meets low resistance and doesn’t have ‘problems.’”69
Although some observers have perceived a recent increase in quality of Indonesia’s
democratic institutions, particularly in regard to the recent presidential election of antiestablishment reform candidate Joko Widodo, the nation still scores low on measures of
accountability; as of 2013, only 50% of Indonesians are confident in the honesty their country’s
elections.70 Ultimately, the weak institutionalization of Indonesia’s devolved political units, as well
as their vulnerability to political manipulation by a large number of former political figures, led to
the resurgence of Suharto-style political patronage and money politics within Indonesia,
delegitimizing the state’s democratic institutions and reducing political accountability.

Political Accountability in the Philippines
Indonesia’s comparative decline in political accountability is contrasted by the experience of
the Philippines, which has largely succeeded in implementing and institutionalizing mechanisms of
democratic accountability since the implementation of decentralization. Unlike in Indonesia, where
Suharto-era politicians were able to take advantage of the availability of executive positions in the
districts to reintegrate themselves into the political order, the Philippines under Aquino was able to
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successfully dismantle the patronage systems that Marcos had utilized to govern the state during his
twenty-year regime. Before his resignation, Marcos himself had destroyed the traditional two-party
system in the Philippines, and the fragmentation of his own New Society Movement in 1986 left no
other organization with an institutionalized patronage network strong enough to dominate the
national level.71 This vacuum of power within the Philippine political order provided an opportunity
for unorthodox and unknown figures to successfully compete for the comparatively few positions
available in the new LGUs. In particular, Philippine women found themselves following in the
footsteps of their female president, and mobilizing as an effective and influential political force for
the first time in the state’s history.72
As previously described, the potential for conflict between the national legislators creating
the 1991 Local Government Code and the local executives they were empowering led to the
implementation of highly effective accountability mechanisms regarding the election of local
executives. Provincial governors (Local Chief Executives, or LCEs) are vulnerable to termination
through an immediate popular vote under a special recall election, which can be called at any time.
In addition, mechanisms for direct legislation through referenda have been implemented as
supplemental mechanisms against unresponsive or corrupt governors.73
As part of President Aquino’s long-standing policy to incorporate her People Power
Revolution activist allies into governance of their country, civil society groups were granted
participation in local health and school boards, peace and order councils, and development councils
at all levels of local government. LCEs now routinely consult with private sector and nongovernmental organization representatives to make decisions.74 The Barangay-Bayan Governance
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Consortium (BBGC), a group of NGOs in the Philippines focused on issues of local governance and
the empowerment of disenfranchised communities, has successfully trained 2,500 villages and
communities in the technologies for participatory development planning, generating increased
capacity among political figures in the Philippines, who had been accustomed to traditional “expose
and oppose” politics as opposed to sincere engagement.75 These NGOs have been praised for the
consistently high quality of their roles in governing and advising LGUs.76 This large role played by
NGOs is one of several factors limiting the autonomous executive authority of the nation’s LCEs.
The Philippines today confronts the same challenges to political accountability, such as
disproportional electoral influence by elites and corporate influence, as those that face middleincome democracies across the region. Nonetheless, the nation has achieved a significant rate of
public confidence in the national government, at 70%, and scores above all of its Southeast Asian
neighbors in the maintenance of political rights.77 Ultimately, the Philippines’s moderate and
methodological program of decentralization, which included restraints on the political autonomy of
executives and the incorporation of civil society groups into government, led to the achievement of
this comparatively high degree of political accountability.

Service Delivery in Indonesia
As in the case of political autonomy, Indonesia has struggled to produce effective service
delivery within its decentralized units, largely due to the high degree of fiscal autonomy granted to
these districts in the 1999 Decentralization Law. The fears of a second successful secessionist
campaign to follow that of East Timor dominated Indonesia’s legislature throughout
decentralization deliberation, leading to the inclusion of conciliatory policies allowing districts to
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retain larger shares of income from their natural resources.78 This fiscal autonomy, coupled with the
aforementioned unclear administrative parameters for decentralization, allowed newly empowered
bupati to claim extralegal regulatory power, and therefore revenue generating mechanisms, for
themselves.79 Policies that breached both national law and community interest were implemented in
many cases, with poor implications for the quality of government services in these regions. Districts
took it upon themselves to create new mining, forestry, fishing, and trading licenses, each
containing local taxes and charges, as means of rapidly generating revenue for the district. As a
result, companies operating in these districts were forced to relocate or shut down.80
As another conciliatory gesture to potentially discontented district governments, the 1999
law gave the DPRDs full authority to determine their own budgets, including salaries, allowances,
and other perquisites for members. As a result, DPRDs awarded themselves benefits far higher than
those granted to central government civil service members in Jakarta.81 The large extent of
economic corruption present within Indonesia’s more remote districts is almost comical in its
degree of visibility; visitors to these districts note the presence of numerous half-finished proyeks
(district-sponsored projects) such as abandoned ferry docks, unbedded and unedged asphalt roads
(which slid down the hill face during the first seasonal rainstorm), and the route of the only paved
road in one district, which led directly from the ferry to the bupati‘s own childhood home.82
Since the implementation of decentralization in 1999, the quality of services provided by
Indonesia’s district governments has largely failed to uphold the standards set out by that
legislation. A survey of pre- and post-decentralization fiscal outcomes found that increased
spending of district governments has largely been on activities that do not directly benefit the poor
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and unemployed.83 A detailed evaluation of the delivery of services in one city found that “the
overall institutional capacity of local government agencies was relatively low or unsatisfactory.”84
In 2004, studies by the regime found that decentralization had not led to participatory and more
innovative services in maternal and child health care.85 The economic climates of many districts
remain stagnant or otherwise unappealing; a survey of the opinions of local business leaders across
Indonesian districts on local regulations related to business activities found very few positive
responses. These same experiences were mirrored by civil registry services, which have faced
sustained efficiency challenges.86 Ultimately, as a result of the high degree of fiscal autonomy of the
nation’s fledgling districts, improvement in local government service delivery in Indonesia has not
been decisively demonstrated.87

Service Delivery in the Philippines
In contrast to Indonesia, the Philippines has experienced increased effectiveness of service
delivery following decentralization throughout its LGUs, particularly in the area of healthcare,
which comprised the majority of national government functions decentralized to the LGU level in
1991,88 and in the attraction of foreign direct investment. The 1991 Local Government Code
provided for the development, in every region, of a Local Health Board, in which Department of
Health (DOH) bureaucrats, local health officers, and representatives from NGOs and the private
sector advise LCEs on health plans and budget. To ensure that these devolutionary provisions were
implemented thoroughly and timely, the LGUs created Transition Action Teams at the regional and
district levels to attend to local government concerns. The result has been an exceptional number of
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Comprehensive Health Care Agreements, in which programs are implemented with both DOH
assistance and cooperation between multiple LGUs. One example of the contribution of LGUs to
Philippine healthcare has been a highly praised emergency rescue service in the city of Naga, which
was able to evolve into a massive activity involving 15 LGUs across the metro Naga region.89
Impressive innovation and experimentation in other areas of service delivery has also
occurred in the Philippine’s LGUs. Municipal governments in Masinloc, Sta. Maria, and Kalibo
have initiated novel management administrations for the protection of environmental, marine, and
coastal resources. City governments in Cebu, Naga, Muntinlupa, and Bulacan pioneered in the
adaption of “e-government” models, in which informational technologies are utilized to facilitate
transparency and ensure completion of government policies and transactions.90 The national
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council succeeded greatly in cooperating with
urban NGOs and POs to develop a massive urban land reform law that benefited city slum dwellers
across the archipelago.91 The impressive degree of service delivery innovation that has occurred in
the Philippines is encouraged and developed by the Galing Pook Awards (GPA) program, in which
LGUs compete and win prizes for advances in the provision of services. From 1994-2005, over
1,400 local programs and projects were submitted to the GPAs, 208 of which were judged
outstanding, trailblazing, or otherwise impressively effective programs.92
Arguably the greatest success story of service delivery in a Philippine LGU is that of Cebu,
a newly prominent province in the middle of the country. Since the reforms of 1991, Cebu City has
become a textbook model for successful economic modernization and rapid development based on
attraction of foreign direct investment and international tourist dollars. Cebu’s economic miracle,
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known as the “Ceboom,” occurred largely as the result of the takeover of central government
functions by homegrown and civically aware LCEs and their administrations. Since 1991, tax
collection in the province has become more efficient, police reform has led to a vast decline in
crime, and local educational institutions have emphasized mathematics and financial studies to a
higher degree. As a result, the Japanese camera makers and American watchmakers that have set up
shop on the island are now hiring Cebuano high school graduates to manage their factories. Cebu’s
economic miracle is a reflection of the great advantages of competent and effective local service
delivery; as the mayor of one Cebu suburb attested, “when people see their taxes being spent on
things such as infrastructure and education, they are more willing to pay.”93
Today, Philippine provinces continue to measurably demonstrate a higher quality of local
service delivery than their Indonesian counterparts. 83% of Filipinos are satisfied with government
efforts to address poverty, as opposed to 30% of Indonesians, the Philippines boast an average
classroom size half that of Indonesia, and more Filipinos than Indonesians believe that their country
is a good place for entrepreneurs to start a business.94 It was the Indonesian decentralization
program’s conciliatory policies regarding fiscal accountability and revenue generation in its
districts, many of which are small and remote enough to be effectively dominated by their bupati’s
own patronage networks, which led to a high degree of patronage, corruption, and rent seeking,
diminishing the quality of service delivery. In contrast, the moderate, methodological, and highly
inclusive decentralization program of the Philippines has succeeded in fostering service delivery
innovation and advancement across the country’s LGUs, leading to particularly significant
achievements in the areas of healthcare and export-oriented industrialization.
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Decentralization and Identity-Based Conflict
While only Indonesia’s decentralization policy was initiated in direct response to the threat
of secession, specifically the implications of East Timor’s independence and the threat of similar
movements in Aceh and Papua, both Indonesia and the Philippines intended for political
decentralization to pacify or otherwise diminish long-simmering separatist movements on the
fringes of their archipelagos. In the Philippines, separatism was much less of an immediate anxiety,
as the 1987 Constitution had already provided for autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras, and neither of those secessionist campaigns had escalated to full-scale warfare.
However, the 1991 Local Government Code nonetheless granted these autonomous regions
additional powers to those given LGUs in an attempt to resolve these movements entirely.95 Both
the Indonesian and Philippine programs therefore had intentions to suppress and coopt separatist
campaigns through the increased autonomy granted by decentralization; however, these strategies,
with few exceptions, failed to meet expectations in both countries.
In the case of the Philippines, neither the Autonomous Region of Mindanao (ARMM) nor
that of the Cordillera (ARC) achieved the standards of autonomy promised by the Constitution and
the 1991 Local Government Code. The central government in Manila still provides 97% of
ARMM’s annual income, and has denied the ARMM many of its legislated authorities.96 In the case
of the ARC, de jure autonomy was never established in the first place, yet alone implemented. That
process was frozen when ten out of eleven electorates in the province rejected the original proposed
administrative arrangements on two separate occasions. A third legislative proposal is in the works,
but the center has governed the region in the meantime, meaning that the ARC has effectively been
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denied the autonomy granted to it nearly thirty years ago.97 Violence has sporadically reemerged in
both regions, and contentious political struggles have erupted over land rights, economic
mismanagement, and environmental degradation, due in part to megaprojects initiated by the center
such as the San Roque Dam on the Ango River.98
In Indonesia, resolution of the Acehnese and Papuan separatist movements did eventually
occur, but the decentralization law itself played only a small role in this process. In 2004, five years
after the implementation of decentralization, the outlook for a peaceful settlement in Aceh remained
extremely bleak. Brutal fighting between the guerrilla Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh
Merdeka, or GAM) and the military had intensified greatly since Suharto’s fall in 1998, culminating
in a massive bombing effort by the military in 2003, reportedly inspired by the American “shock
and awe” approach in Iraq that same year.99 What finally brought GAM leaders to the negotiating
table was not these counter-insurgency measures, however, but the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami,
which affected Aceh more than any other area on the Indian Ocean coast, and ultimately left
166,000 people dead or missing.100 In the wake of such devastation and loss of life, the Indonesian
government and GAM agreed to a set of even vaster autonomy measures, which were passed as the
Law on the Governance of Aceh in 2006.101
While the resolution of conflict in Aceh did successfully occur, albeit at the cost of largescale military suppression, a devastating natural disaster, and the granting of increased autonomy,
resolving other regional struggles in the country proved more difficult. The Free Papua Movement
(Organisasi Papua Merdeka, or OPM), another guerrilla movement on the opposite end of the
archipelago, has repeatedly denied attempts by the central government to introduce supplementary
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autonomy arrangements in Papua, and by 2004 Indonesian troops were once again committed to the
region.102 Yet the Papuan insurgency has led to much less violence than the civil conflict in the
region of Maluku, where the devastating aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis and the political
turmoil of Suharto’s collapse sparked long-simmering disputes between Christians and Muslims in
the region. The widespread violence ultimately led to over 4,000 causalities and the long-term
presence of Indonesian military forces in what was deemed a regional “failed state.” A peace
agreement was signed in 2002, but small-scale violence occurred until 2004, almost five years after
the implementation of decentralization.103
In short, while the Philippines and Indonesia both intended to suppress and pacify separatist
agitation through the decentralization of political power and fiscal responsibility, these conflicts
ultimately ended through other means, or in some cases never concluded in the first place. While
Indonesia was able to prevent secession in Aceh and Papua and conclude large-scale violence in
Maluku, this was only at the cost of military suppression and large-scale natural disaster in these
regions, none of which were able to enjoy the local autonomy and fiscal responsibility benefits
outlined in the decentralization legislation until only recently. Uncharacteristically, the Philippines
has achieved arguably even less progress in this area, as it has not provided for autonomy in either
of its autonomous regions, but rather continues to informally govern these spaces from the center.
Neither the Philippines nor Indonesia have truly succeeded in utilizing decentralization as a means
to settle these lengthy and deep-rooted secessionist conflicts, demonstrating that political
decentralization may not be able to play a large role in mitigating separatist sentiment in historically
rebellious regions in the first place.
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Conclusion
While political decentralization has long been a favored solution of neoliberal theorists for a
wide variety of issues in governance, the actual implications of political decentralization in states
with historically weak political institutions and lower income economies have not been decisively
investigated. The Southeast Asian states of Indonesia and the Philippines both have long histories of
centralized authoritarian government over highly diverse communities, resulting in high degrees of
economic corruption and political patronage. Following the collapse of these dictatorships in the
close of the 20th century, both countries engaged in significant programs of decentralization;
however, these policies have ultimately engendered a higher degree of political accountability and
effective service delivery in the Philippines than in Indonesia.
It was predicted that the long-term success of a decentralization program ultimately depends
on the political and social environment in which it is conceptualized and implemented. In particular,
“big bang” decentralization, referring to a rapid and dramatic process of devolution for the primary
purpose of staving off regional secession, will likely succeed in the short-term goal of maintaining
territorial integrity, but will carry long-term political and economic ramifications, due to the breadth
of its affected areas and the haste of its implementation. By contrast, a program of decentralization
engendered in a stable and politically popular legislative environment, in which the retention of
national sovereignty is not a high priority, will be more methodologically designed, more
effectively implemented, and contain greater mechanisms for the moderation of local political
autonomy and the encouragement of innovative service delivery.
Decentralization in the Philippines largely followed the model espoused by many of the
proponents of decentralization, in that it occurred under the popular and established regime of
Corazon Aquino for the purpose of greater political enfranchisement and increased economic
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prosperity, as opposed to any concerns over secession or sovereignty. The 1991 Local Government
Code was constructed and deliberated on for close to four years, during which many of the
mechanisms for delivering political accountability and ensuring quality service delivery were
effectively implemented. The executives of the Philippines’ Local Government Units were therefore
empowered and motivated to deliver high quality governance in their provinces.
In the case of Indonesia, the national trauma of a recently successful secessionist movement
in East Timor, along with threats of the same in Aceh and Papua, ultimately spurred the regime to
rapidly draw up and implement a radical program of decentralization. Because this legislation was
both broad in nature and vague in definition, and purposefully by-passed the contentious regional
level for the 300 plus district governments instead, political and economic power in these districts
was easily corruptible. The executives in these districts, many of whom were retained from the
Suharto era, gained immense political power almost overnight, and were able to construct local
political patronage networks and coopt the revenues from the communities they governed. The
long-term result has been a high degree of political and economic corruption in many of Indonesia’s
districts, and today, the Philippines regularly outperforms Indonesia in surveys of perception of
political accountability and service delivery in those states.
Ultimately, the implication of this investigation is that political decentralization is a much
more nuanced and unpredictable process than its traditional advocates would suggest, particularly in
the context of newly emerging middle-income states in developing regions like Southeast Asia. The
factors of territorial integrity and political stability are rarely mentioned in the literature, but, as
demonstrated in the case of Indonesia, can play a large role in the degree of success of a
decentralization program. It is worth noting that, despite motives to the contrary, neither the
Philippine nor Indonesian experiences of decentralization have led to increased ethnic stability or
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political legitimacy in those states’ most dissenting regions. This is a problematic failure by both
cases that deserves future investigation, as it may represent a critical caveat to most theories of
decentralization, which do not take into account ethnic or other identity-based relations in the
absence of a historically institutionalized national identity.
Ultimately, this paper should not be considered evidence against decentralization as a
general political process. Despite the tumultuous implementation of devolutionary policies in
Indonesia, it is undeniable that the country’s path since 1998 has largely been a progressive one, as
a fragile but consistently capable democratic government has led one of the longest and most
sustained economic turnarounds in the country’s history. Very few Indonesians would claim that
their lives were better under Suharto than they are today, and those who would were likely
responsible for the corruption and repression that characterized that era in the first place. This
comparison is instead intended to illustrate the need for a more comprehensive model for political
decentralization, one that incorporates the experiences of middle-income, newly democratic, and
ethnically diverse states, where quality political accountability mechanisms and service delivery
effectiveness are not necessarily guaranteed, but may in fact be hindered by over-autonomy and
political retrenchment in the long run.
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